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SYSTEMICREGULATIONOFGLOBALTRADE
ANDFINANCE: ATALEOFTWOSYSTEMS
R. Michael Gadbaw*
ABSTRACT
The recent financial crisis has put enormous strains on the global systems
governing international finance and trade. These two important international
regulatory systems, created after World War II to promote growth and sta-
bility in the global economy, were put to the test in ways unprecedented
since the 1930s. This article seeks to analyze and compare their performance
as systemic regulators in the course of the crisis and concludes that the
trading system performed quite well while the financial system virtually col-
lapsed. This article seeks to account for this difference by looking at the
nature of the rules and the institutions governing each and how they evolved
so differently over the past 70 years. Central to the success of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) is a regulatory approach that includes rules de-
signed, and tested in practice, to align incentives with the public good and
prevent regulatory capture and a self-enforcing dispute settlement mechan-
ism that ensures accountability and enforceability. The article concludes that
these differences hold important lessons for the reform of the rules and
institutions governing finance and trade in the global economy, and the
role the WTO should play in this reform.
I. TRADE AND FINANCE: THE TWIN PILLARS OF SYSTEMIC
REGULATION OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
A. Nature or nurture?
The interplay of two global regulatory systems—finance and trade1—
deserves scrutiny in our thinking about the crisis of 2007–09 with respect
* Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; Distinguished Senior Fellow, Institute
for International Economic Law. In the interest of full disclosure, note that this article draws
on the author’s experience working in international economic law: in the White House
(summer of 1973); in the Treasury Department and the Office of the US Trade
Representative (1975–80); in private law firms (1980 to 1990) representing, among others,
the semiconductor and computer industries; as Vice President and Senior Counsel of General
Electric (1990 to 2008). E-mail: mgadbaw@verizon.net
1 The interplay of trade and finance is as old as economic history itself. See William J. Bernstein,
A Splendid Exchange; How Trade Shaped the World (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2008)
18: ‘First, trade is an irreducible and intrinsic human impulse, as primal as the needs for food,
shelter, sexual intimacy, and companionship. Second, our urge to trade has profoundly affected
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to what happened, the underlying causes, and how to identify and implement
reforms that will mitigate or prevent crises of this magnitude in the future.
Parallels to the Great Depression have been drawn as analysts, policymakers,
regulators, politicians, and the general public try to develop a narrative to
explain the events that reverberated across national borders to virtually every
corner of the globe, utilizing the channels of globalization to spread the
impact and threatening to undo many of the benefits (wealth, economic
growth and asset values) to which trade and capital flows have been so in-
strumental. This article seeks to contribute to this dialogue by comparing and
contrasting the way the global financial system and the global trading system
performed as systemic regulators through the crisis. The argument will be
made that the dramatic differences in the way each of these performed, with
the collapse of the financial system while the trading system experienced only
a minor disruption, can be attributed to important differences in their under-
lying regulatory systems as reflected by their respective institutions, the rules,
dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms. Ultimately, we find two
profoundly contrasting regulatory paradigms for trade and finance, reflecting
underlying differences in market dynamics and policies regarding the inter-
action of markets and rules. How did these mutually interdependent systems
evolve side by side in such dramatically different directions?
The importance of this debate should not be underestimated. Although
the global economy is recovering from the worst of the asset declines in
housing, household wealth and financial institution solvency, the question
remains whether the global economy can recover in the absence of a greater
sense of confidence among investors, consumers, employers and employees
that comparable crises can be avoided or at least mitigated in the future.
Moreover, can the global economy function properly when the two systems
of trade and finance seem so out of synch in terms of the quality of their
regulatory frameworks and the strains that must be absorbed by one when
the other fails to carry its weight in maintaining the stability of the overall
system.
B. Systemic performance—finance and trade—crisis to crisis
The totality of the collapse in our global economy, attributed in part to
economic policies and regulatory failures, has led us to take a system wide
view of causes and effects. Systemic failure and its counterparty systemic risk
have entered our public policy lexicon. This kind of top down preoccupation
has its historical parallels. The Great Depression prompted a rethink of our
economic policies and the adoption of Keynesian intervention to promote
the trajectory of the human species.’ See also Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial
History of the World (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008) 2: ‘Despite our deeply rooted
prejudices against ‘‘filthy lucre’’, however, money is the root of most progress.’
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full employment and economic growth. Internationally, Lord Keynes and his
colleagues seized the opportunity in the aftermath of the World War II
to create the Bretton Woods triumvirate, comprising the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to bring countries together in a comprehensive
set of international institutions based on the rule of law and the principles of
free trade and economic integration.2 The series of financial crises over the
ensuing decades—starting with the US decision to abandon the gold stand-
ard in the early 1970s,3 followed by the Russian and Latin American crises
of the 1990s, and the Asian crisis of 1998—actually reinforced the view that
the system, as it had evolved at those times, was sound and could be man-
aged, by the likes of the Committee to Save the World,4 to handle the
occasional crisis.
Now we find ourselves thinking once again about systemic failure, systemic
risk and systemic regulation. Systemic risk is generally used only in connec-
tion with financial regulation to refer to ‘a problem with payment or settle-
ment systems or . . . some type of financial failure that induces a
macroeconomic crisis’.5 For reasons explained more fully below, the concept
is used here more broadly to encompass a failure of any major pillar of our
global economy, including trade and finance, which leads to a macroeco-
nomic crisis. Including the trading system as a source of systemic risk is
consistent with our historical experience in the 1930s when protectionism
was an important factor in the cause, depth, and length of the Great
Depression. Moreover, this perspective allows us to consider the policies
and institutions that have led us, perhaps too easily, to take for granted
the notion that trade cannot be a source of macroeconomic failure.
In the 1930s, what started as a financial crisis with a run on the banks,
also turned into a full-blown economic crisis and more than a decade of
depressed economic growth, notwithstanding a complete shift in the para-
digm for government intervention from laissez faire to Keynesian
2 For an excellent review of the origins of Bretton Woods and the challenges facing the system in
the aftermath of the financial crisis, see Richard N. Gardner, ‘The Bretton Woods-GATT
System after Sixty-five Years: A Balance Sheet of Success and Failure’, 47 Columbia Journal
of Transnational Law 26 (2008), at 27; see also the paper by Andreas Lowenfeld in this issue
at 575–595.
3 One of the key linkages between trade and finance has been the use of trade measures for
balance of payments reasons, the most significant case of which was the 10% import surcharge
imposed by President Nixon in 1971. See John H. Jackson, William J. Davey and Alan O.
Sikes, Jr., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (5th edn St. Paul, MN: Thomson
West, 2008) 1098–109.
4 This reference comes from the cover of Time, 15 February 1999, http://www.time.com/time/
covers/0,16641,19990215,00.html (visited 3 August 2010) which featured Robert Rubin,
Lawrence Summers and Alan Greenspan for their work in the aftermath of the Asian financial
crisis.
5 Kern Alexander, Rahul Dhumale and John Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial Systems; the
International Regulation of Systemic Risk, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 24.
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intervention. The critical point for our purposes is the way the trading
system performed as a result of the passage in 1930 of the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act,6 which erected insurmountable tariff barriers on goods coming
into the USA and reduced both the value and the volume of international
trade with the USA by as much as 50%. Not only did this intervention
account for a very high percentage in the decline in trade, as distinct from
the fall in demand, but this intervention was mimicked by other countries
that erected similar barriers around the globe, the cumulative result of which
was to exacerbate the depression and block a critical avenue for post-crisis
recovery.
The contrast with the crisis of 2007–09 is striking. While there was a
decline of around 18% in the peak-to-trough value of international trade
in the first year of the crisis, that decline was virtually entirely the result of
a decline in demand, not of government intervention.7 Under the scrutiny of
global institutions and private trackers, the government interventions were of
minor consequence; less than 1% of global trade by some accounts.8 In the
second year after the crisis (2011), global trade is expected to grow at a rate
of over 9%; and for many countries, not least the USA, international trade is
seen as one of the critical channels for economic recovery.9
In contrast to the trading system, which performed well throughout the
crisis, the financial system seems to have failed in fundamental ways across
the spectrum of monetary policy and prudential supervision.10
6 United States: Tariff Act of 1930, Act of June 17, 1930, 46 Stat. 685.
7 The performance of the WTO in the course of the crisis has been ably analyzed in Brendan
Ruddy, ‘The Critical Success of the WTO: Trade Policies of the Current Economic Crisis’,
13(2) Journal of International Economic Law 287 (2010) 475–95. Ruddy looks at the eco-
nomic literature and the tracking systems that document and measure the effect of protec-
tionist measures and concludes: ‘unlike the trade restrictive measures of the Great Depression,
measures taken during the current economic crisis have not materially contributed to the
decline in trade volume and GDP’. This conclusion is also supported by the WTO’s own
analysis.
8 Ibid, fn 48 and accompanying text.
9 For a very thorough analysis of the failure of protectionism to manifest in the course of the
recent crisis, with a very low-key endorsement of the WTO’s role, see Simon J. Evenett,
Bernard M. Hoekman and Olivier Cattaneo (eds), Effective Crisis Response and Openness:
Implications for the Trading System (Washington, DC: World Bank and Center for Economic
and Policy Research, 2009), at 5. The countries that were most protectionist in their re-
sponses were not members of the WTO (Algeria and Russia) (p. 5).
10 To assist the reader, the primary sources for this description of the crisis are collected here.
For a first hand account of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing collapse of the
financial markets, see Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail (New York: Viking, 2009). Michael
Lewis has looked at the small group of hedge fund managers who saw the coming crisis and
took advantage of it by betting against it in Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday
Machine (London: Allen Lane, 2009). Nassim Nicholas Taleb has looked at the role of fi-
nancial models for valuing assets and risks and how these models miscalculated the probabil-
ity of events with catastrophic consequences in Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The
Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2007). Richard A. Posner docu-
ments his own conversion from a Chicago school critic of excessive financial regulation to a
more pragmatic advocate for the proper balance of regulations and the market in a capitalist
554 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 13(3)
 by R
. M
ichael G
adbaw
 on M
arch 13, 2011
jiel.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
There is a growing consensus that regulators individually—and the regu-
latory system as a whole—should have anticipated some of the consequences
of the behavior of the market and market participants and responded to
counter those effects before they led to the collapse of the financial
system.11 It is this systemic character of the collapse that lends the most
credence to the conclusion that the regulators failed, because it appears that
quite a number of factors had to work together to create an overall
system-wide failure. What began as an asset bubble in the housing
market12 was fed by the availability of easy money (caused in part by
global imbalances involving high saving countries like China and India ex-
porting capital to low savings countries like the USA and UK) and was
exacerbated by the ability of banks to securitize mortgages and move risk
from their balance sheets to the broader markets, which in turn responded
system, first in Richard A. Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ’08 and the descent into
Depression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) and Richard A. Posner, The
Crisis of Capitalist Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). Simon
Johnson has analyzed the concentration of the banking industry and the role of campaign
contributions in shaping the regulatory framework for finance in Simon Johnson, 13 Bankers:
The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010).
11 Some of the major regulatory failings cited as causes of the crisis: the failure of the monetary
system to deal with global imbalances which facilitated the lax monetary policy of the Federal
Reserve and the unwillingness to recognize the systemic risk of excessive credit leading to exces-
sive risk taking; the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in subsidizing home ownership and the
role of their implicit government guarantee in excessive risk taking, the role of the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977 (Codified to 12 U.S.C. 2901 note; Section 801 et seq. of title VIII of
the Act of October 12, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–128; 91 Stat. 1147, effective October 12, 1977) in
requiring federal regulatory agencies to encourage banks to take on excessive risks in subprime
mortgages; the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) decision to loosen the leverage
requirements on investment banks, failure of the SEC to identify the burgeoning fraud in regu-
lated financial institutions; the repeal of the Glass–Steagell Act (The Banking Act of 1933, 48
Stat. 162) restrictions on the separation of investment and commercial banking, the authorization
inGramm-Leach-Bliley Act (The Financial ServicesModernization Act of 1999, 113 Stat. 1338,
Public Law 106–102) for financial holding companies to enter into a wide array of activities
including banking insurance and securities while still enjoying federal deposit insurance; the
failure to regulate over the counter derivatives later confirmed by legislation, the failure to see
flaws in the AAA ratings that the rating agencies were giving to securitized mortgages, the failure
of the Fed to regulate predatory lending of non-bank financial institutions, the failure to see how
AAA-rated, mortgage-backed securities would undermine bank balance sheets, the failure to see
the inadequacy of the risk assessment models of financial institutions and the failure to regulate
the size of financial institutions leading to the too-big-to-fail problem. See generally Howard
Davies and David Green, Global Financial Regulation: The Essential Guide (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2008); James Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Ross Levine, Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till
Angels Govern (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) which presents a comparative
study of bank regulation across 150 countries; Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson,
Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System (New Jersey: JohnWiley& Sons, 2009).
12 In California, in 2007, over 90% of the securitized mortgages were so-called thin file mort-
gages, that is, there was no verification of the income of the borrower; most of the mortgages
insured by Freddie and Fannie were subprime mortgages since only 12% of the Californian
population could afford a median priced home (See Howard Savage, Current Housing
Reports: ‘Who Could Afford to Buy a Home in 2004’, US Census Bureau, Issued May 9,
2009).
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by creating insurance policies against the failure of these mortgage-backed
securities and the institutions that held them. The volume of insurance
policies on mortgage-backed securities, allowing investors to bet for and
against their failure, by far exceeded the amount of underlying mortgages.
The appetite for these mortgage-backed securities and their related insurance
policies spread across the global financial system. Because many of these
securities were rated AAA by the credit-rating agencies, some institutions
could originate the instruments and sell them for a handsome fee while
others could buy them as part of their underlying capital structure, allowing
them to leverage themselves further to do more and more lending.
What regulators and market participants missed were the inherent risks of
this interaction, which in hindsight have become all too clear. When housing
prices started to decline, institutions at the center of the mortgage origin-
ation and securitization process started to fail. These failures tipped the
balance in the market, undermining the value of mortgage-backed securities
and in turn the institutions that held them. Because the mortgages were so
much a part of the capital structure of many financial institutions, what
started as a liquidity crisis quickly turned into a solvency crisis, which very
quickly implicated institutions so interconnected that their failure (or im-
pending failure) brought to a halt the entire system by which financial insti-
tutions perform their functions of clearing payments, intermediating
investment, and allocating risk and capital. Compounding all of these
market interactions are allegations of lack of transparency, fraud and misrep-
resentation at both the transactional and institutional level, together with
complicity on the part of regulators who were mandated to oversee risk
management, consumer protection, institutional integrity, and the proper
functioning of markets.
At the end of the day, the numbers tell a story but cannot capture the full
impact. In the USA alone, $11 trillion in household wealth and 8 million
jobs were lost as the economy hit an annualized rate of decline in gross
domestic product (GDP) of 6.2% in the fourth quarter of 2008.13
The contrast in the performance of the global trade and financial systems
in the course of the recent crisis leads to an important conclusion for pol-
icymakers: while systemic failure was the chief characteristic of the global
financial system, the trading system, judged on its face solely by its perform-
ance in the course of this crisis, has emerged as a candidate for the most
successful systemic regulator in the history of humankind.14 The next section
of this article analyzes this characterization by comparing the regulatory
13 Catherine Rampell, ‘GDP Revision Suggests a Long, Steep Downfall’, New York Times,
27 February 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/business/economy/28econ.html (vis-
ited 10 September 2010).
14 See R. Michael Gadbaw, ‘The WTO as a Systemic Regulator?’, The Globalist, 16 February
2010, http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?StoryId=8214 (visited 3 August 2010).
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systems governing trade and finance in an attempt to identify those aspects
of the two systems that seem to play the most important roles in protecting
against systemic risk.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TRADE AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS:
BRETTON WOODS REVISITED
A. From a common origin to different paths
In the course of the recent crisis, trade did not exacerbate the crisis by
translating the shock of the stock market crash into a contagion fed by
chain reactions throughout the global economy. Instead, countries heeded
the call in the G-20 statement of November 2008 that all economies refrain
from protectionist interventions in their markets.15 Meanwhile, the capital
markets ground to a halt as the credit markets froze when banks and other
financial institutions were unwilling to lend to all but the most creditworthy
borrowers. This leads to the questions: Why do these regulatory systems look
so different? How did they evolve in such different directions? What were the
aspects of the trading system that helped protect it from systemic failure?
How do these characteristics compare to the financial system?
In considering this question, it is helpful to remind ourselves what a ‘pol-
itical miracle’16 the Bretton Woods system was.17 The American Bankers
Association claimed that the IMF would amount to ‘handing over to an
international body the power to determine the destination, time, and use
of our money . . . abandoning, without receiving anything in return, a vital
part of American bargaining power’.18 The National Foreign Trade Council,
the National Association of Manufacturers and the US Chamber of
Commerce were staunchly opposed to the proposed International Trade
Organization (ITO) and helped to kill it in the US Congress. In the end,
the vision of the founding fathers prevailed:
They conceived of a postwar economic system ruled by law. They wanted
it to be a universal system . . . rather than a collection of trading blocs.
15 Paragraph 48 of the Pittsburgh Summit Communique, September 25, 2009.
16 See Gardner, above n 2, at 28–32. Gardner points out the changes to the world order that
have occurred since 1948, particularly:
the ‘money bags’, the ‘brains’, the economic weight and the political influence are all
more evenly distributed today than they were . . . . Yet the old and difficult issues that
confronted the founding fathers of the Bretton-Woods system are still with us—how to
reconcile freedom of international trade and payments with full employment and social
justice at home, how to balance the need for effective international economic institu-
tions with still-powerful demands for national economic sovereignty, and how to relate
regional and bilateral economic arrangements to a global economic order.
17 Powerful political and intellectual currents on both sides of the Atlantic opposed the creation
of these institutions. Ibid, at 28.
18 Ibid, at 31.
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They wanted permanent international institutions to promote cooperation
on monetary, trade, and development problems. And they wanted some-
how to reconcile the concept of maximum possible freedom in trade and
payments at the international level with the domestic pursuit by govern-
ments of progressive economic and social policies.19
‘Monetary questions had to be dealt with before trade questions . . .be-
cause countries would not be willing to commit themselves to tariff reduc-
tions if the conditions of competition could be completely altered by large
and unforeseen changes in exchange rates.’20 A fixed exchange rate system
based on gold and special drawing rights was adopted when the Keynes
proposal for a Clearing Union with global overdraft facilities proved too
ambitious and the founders anticipated that there would be a high degree
of voluntary coordination of economic policy. From a systemic perspective,
the critical issue that the Bretton Woods founders faced was how to reconcile
an open international trading system with the free movement of capital. In
the end, the importance of open trade took preeminence over capital move-
ments. Finally, there was a fight over whether to authorize, encourage or
prohibit capital controls that ultimately led to a compromise in which capital
controls were allowed, even encouraged, but countries were not required to
cooperate in their application.
For our purposes, the fight over capital controls was the most important
because it pitted the New York bankers against the founders in a fight that
led to the triumph of finance ministries over the New York bankers and their
central bank allies21 and prompted Henry Morgenthau to proclaim that one
of the goals of Bretton Woods was to ‘drive the usurious moneylenders from
the temple of international finance’.22 In this respect, the founders backed
away from a total commitment to an open, liberal international economic
order and, instead, institutionalized the view that ‘a liberal financial order
would not be compatible, at least in the short run, with a stable system of
exchange rates and a liberal trading order’.23 Underlying this position were
complementary economic and strategic views. On the economic side, ‘capital
controls were necessary to prevent the policy autonomy of the new interven-
tionist welfare state from being undermined by speculative and disequilibrat-
ing international capital flows’.24 On the strategic side, the US foreign policy
establishment believed that a benevolent attitude toward the interventionist
19 Ibid, at 32.
20 Ibid, at 36.
21 Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance; From Bretton Woods to the 1990s
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994) 45.
22 Cited in Gardner, above n 2, at 38.
23 Ibid, at 5.
24 Ibid, at 4.
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policies of Europe and Japan was the most effective means of promoting
economic growth and sustaining the Cold War alliance.25
Ironically, the importance of international trade to the policymakers ran
headlong into political reality. When the over ambitious ITO project was
unable to overcome political opposition, the GATT was forced to survive
on life support through most of its early years. Compared to its sister organ-
izations, the IMF and the World Bank—which were busy through the dec-
ades of 1950s and 1960s building up a sizable staff, planting a dramatic
bricks-and-mortar physical footprint in Washington, DC and spending
their considerable resources—the GATT, or more accurately, the Interim
Commission for an ITO, had to struggle in political obscurity until 1968
when the US Congress took the modest step of providing permanent
authorization for contributions to the GATT Secretariat.26 The GATT
took on the challenge of proving itself as an effective international regulatory
framework. Aided by the US willingness to lead with open markets and
Marshall Plan assistance and some exceptional leadership within the organ-
ization from individuals like Eric Wyndham White, the GATT ultimately
concluded eight major rounds of trade negotiations. ‘Pragmatic accommo-
dation, good practical sense, and important leadership led a weak ‘‘birth
defected’’ GATT to become an important part of the world’s international
economic institutional landscape.’27
Europe was the critical partner throughout this period. European support
for the GATT was affirmed politically and economically as the European
Communities transposed the basic framework of the GATT into the core
principles for their economic union and the very identity of Europeans
became associated with economic integration through the elimination of in-
ternal barriers to trade among European countries and eventually the single
European market.
The 1970s proved to be a watershed decade for both the trade and the
international financial system. By the end of the decade, the USA had aban-
doned the dollar’s link to gold, imposed an import surcharge on Japan to
force currency realignment, and launched the modern era of flexible ex-
change rates. Treasury officials decided to reverse their benevolent attitude
toward capital controls and began to adopt policies encouraging the flow of
capital, teaming up with the banks to use commercial leverage to affect the
economic policies of other countries.28 Meanwhile, the GATT concluded the
Tokyo Round. It was the most ambitious trade negotiation round in history
with agreements to lower tariffs, codes on such nontariff barriers as
25 Ibid, at 5.
26 See Gardner, above n 2, at 50–51.
27 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 261.
28 Helleiner, above n 21, 112–115.
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subsidies, government procurement, valuation and standards, and the elim-
ination of some sacred cows (e.g. the American Selling Price system,
Wine-Gallon Proof-Gallon valuation of imported spirits) that had been
grandfathered in the GATT and were a longstanding source of tension
with US trading partners. Approval of this liberalizing package by an over-
whelming vote in Congress, even in the face of a recession, was made pos-
sible by a US fast-track legislative approval scheme that was nothing short of
a revolution in the political economy of trade.29 In short, the table was set
for the globalization of the global economy driven by trade and capital move-
ments that would be the dominant economic story of the following three
decades.
Also important in the 1970s was the emergence of an alliance of right and
left around the theme of regulatory efficiency. Contrary to the views of some
that this was principally a conservative phenomenon, Eduardo Canedo has
argued that the movement that became associated with deregulation had its
roots in the convergence of views from the Chicago School of Economics (on
the right), under the intellectual leadership of George Stigler, and from the
left, under the intellectual and political instigation of Ralph Nader.30 Both
Stigler and Nader were highly skeptical of the role of government regulation,
Stigler out of an innate faith in the market, Nader from the perspective that
regulatory agencies were more likely to be captured by those they were in-
tended to regulate. While these movements diverged over the issue of social
regulation, they were extremely influential in the initiatives to deregulate a
number of areas, from aviation and trucking to natural gas and power
generation.
29 For a detailed account of the political history of trade politics, see I. M. Destler, American
Trade Politics, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005).
30 See Eduardo Canedo, ‘The Rise of the Deregulation Movement in Modern America
1957–1980’ (2009 PhD dissertation on file at Columbia University, Department of
History), at 97 (cited with the permission of the author). See also Joshua Green, ‘Inside
Man’, The Atlantic Monthly, April 2010 (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/
04/inside-man/7992/) and a description of the defections from the Chicago School in John
Cassidy, ‘After the Blowup; Laissez-Faire Economists Do Some Soul-Searching – and
Finger-Pointing’, The New Yorker, 11 January 2010, 28. John Cassidy recounts a history
lesson from Richard A. Posner, a jurist and intellectual leader of the Chicago School:
By the late 1980s, with the collapse of Communism, the basic insights of the Chicago
School about deregulation and incentives had been accepted worldwide, he recalled,
and the bitter enmity between Chicago and its rival economics departments had faded.
Eventually, many of the founders of the Chicago School died, and were replaced by
more moderate figures, such as Thaler and Levitt. Now, largely as a result of mis-
guided efforts to extend deregulation to the finance industry, we have experienced the
biggest economic blowup since the nineteen-thirties. Posner, who appeared to be
enjoying his role as a heretic, paused, then said, ‘So probably the term ‘‘Chicago
School’’ should be retired’.
Available at: http://mfs.uchicago.edu/pastworkshops/capitalisms/readings/After_the_Blowup.
pdf (visited 3 August 2010).
560 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 13(3)
 by R
. M
ichael G
adbaw
 on M
arch 13, 2011
jiel.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
It was the resurgence of US competitiveness in the 1980s and the confi-
dence that it gave to Americans that helped support the extreme monetary
policies that Paul Volcker introduced in the early 1980s to break the grip of
inflation on the US economy. The success of this policy in turn helped form
the basis for the Washington Consensus, namely that the key to international
development lay in the adoption of carefully managed monetary policies,
open trade policies and liberalizing financial markets. The strong US econ-
omy buttressed the role of the US dollar and overwhelmed any efforts to
replace it with the special drawing right or other currencies. It also gave US
Treasury officials few incentives to consider new rules for global finance.
New rules for the global world of finance were unnecessary because domestic
policymakers could oversee the system, and all that was needed were loose
confederations of regulators whose objective would be the exchange of ideas
on collective problem solving.
It is said that nothing succeeds like success, and this unfettered model of
regulation marked an era of unprecedented growth in the financial sector and
the proliferation of financial instruments. While global trade grew steadily
over the past 50 years, exceeding GDP growth rates and reaching $14 trillion
by 2007, financial assets saw explosive growth from being about equal to
global GDP in 1980 to over three times GDP by the end of 2005. By 2007,
financial services accounted for over one third of corporate profits in the
USA and an estimated 5.9% of US GDP, up from 3.5% of GDP in 1978
depending on how you calculate it.31 This explosion in the markets for fi-
nancial services was accompanied by the globalization of those markets and
the combination of size, complexity, growth and global scope beyond the
grasp, if not the reach, of national regulators set the stage for what some
predicted would be a systemic crisis of global proportions.32
Somewhat ironically, the financial community was one of the most ardent
supporters of the emerging rules of the international trading system, even as
they resisted regulation as it would be applied to finance. Moreover, financial
interests, through their associations, sought new rules in the context of the
international trading system but their focus was on limiting restrictions that
countries could use to constrain the operations of financial institutions across
borders. These new rules were developed in what eventually became known
as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), incorporated with
31 Johnson, n 10, at 60–61.
32 See Alexander et al., above n 5, at 7: ‘The recent history of capital market liberalization has
coincided with a swing in the balance of intellectual influence from a postwar theory of
economic policy that urged national governments to limit international capital movements
to the present-day theory that encourages free capital movements and the abdication of na-
tional regulatory powers. So financial stability is largely a matter of convention.’ Written in
2006, these authors make one of the most compelling predictions at page 9: ‘Recent crises
suggest the current international efforts to regulate financial systems lack coherence and
legitimacy and fail to effectively manage systemic risk.’
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the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, and subject to further ne-
gotiations in the Doha Round.33
Meanwhile, as predicted, the floating exchange rate system did lead to
crises, but these were successfully managed on an ad hoc basis with govern-
mental and IMF bailouts that were seen as confirmation of the importance
of implementing more rigorously the Washington Consensus, particularly in
emerging markets. The importance of crisis management in preparing indi-
viduals and their mindset for the latest crisis is well described by Joshua
Green in his profile of Timothy Geithner:
Geithner came of age in Washington just after the Cold War ended, when
the country’s preoccupation with wealth and the long bull market made
Treasury a nerve center of the government. It helps explain Geithner to
think of him as someone whose formative experience was in figuring out
how to contain the series of upheavals that swept the international finan-
cial community in the 1990s, from Japan to Mexico to Thailand to
Indonesia to Russia, and threatened the boom. Toward the end of the
Clinton administration, a view emerged that the government had more
or less figured out how to manage the global financial system. Those at
the helm won extraordinary renown. The era’s time-capsule-worthy arti-
fact is a Time cover touting Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve chair-
man, Robert Rubin, the Treasury secretary, and Lawrence Summers,
Rubin’s deputy, as ‘The Committee to Save the World’. Geithner was
an aide de camp.34
It was roughly during this same period from 1980 to 1995 when the
trading system made its most extraordinary evolution into a global systemic
regulatory system. The great debate—whether the GATT should be a
rule-based system with a juridical function or an essentially diplomatic fa-
cilitator where trade issues could be resolved through negotiations—was
resolved in favor of converting soft law into hard law or hard-hard law. It
is nothing short of revolutionary that the Uruguay Round was concluded
with a single undertaking that every country in the world was required to
take or leave and a dispute settlement understanding that gave any country
the right to challenge the practices of any other country, no matter how big
or small. Whether this system would work or not was unclear but the history
33 The Financial Service portion of the GATS deals narrowly with measures that limit the cross
border establishment and operation of financial institutions but the obligations are imple-
mented not on a generalized basis but country by country and measure by measure, depend-
ing on the willingness of countries to incorporate the obligation into their schedule. The
prudential exception [General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex on Financial
Services, para. 2(a)] could be a framework for incorporating rules on prudential supervision
and this exception is subject to WTO dispute settlement, however, there has been little
interest in this possibility to date. For the most part, countries have simply incorporated
into their schedules their existing framework of regulations.
34 Joshua Green, ‘Inside Man’, The Atlantic Monthly, April 2010, http://www.theatlantic
.com/magazine/archive/2010/03/inside-man/7992/ (visited 3 August 2010).
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since then is clear; the enforcement record of the institution is singular and
the stress test of the Great Contraction has confirmed at least to date that
the system is still holding.35
By the dawn of 2007, these two systems that started life from a com-
mon conception had evolved two very different regulatory and institutional
structures. The WTO became a member-driven, rule-oriented, unitary,
comprehensive and nearly universal system where the obligations run hori-
zontally from members to other members, decisions are made by consensus,
and obligations are interpreted and enforced through a dispute settlement
mechanism with a highly developed juridical function having the power
to determine violations and authorize sanctions. The international
financial regulatory system became a fragmented, complex, multi-tiered,
multi-dimensional, resource-oriented system36 that accommodates the differ-
ent domains and regulatory prerogatives of finance officials, central bankers,
and bank regulators as well as the private financial community by creating a
variety of different organizations from treaty-based to intergovernmental to
cooperative arrangements among functional regulators.
B. Contrasting regulatory philosophies
The philosophical principles underlying the global trading system will be
explored in some detail in the next section, so it is sufficient here to set
up in contrast some of the core thinking around the financial system through
the views of two of the major operational and intellectual leaders (Alan
Greenspan and Robert Rubin) reflecting on why they did not anticipate
the crisis.
It is helpful to start with the October 2008 testimony of Alan Greenspan,
former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, which posed the question: ‘What
35 See WTO Appellate Body, ‘Annual Report for 2009’, WT/AB/13, 17 February 2010.
36 There is an interesting view that the IMF started as a rule-based system while the GATT
started on a more flexible, ‘ideas-based’ system but they reversed their characters over time.
See Barry Eichengreen and Peter B. Kenen, ‘Managing the World Economy under the
Bretton Woods System: An Overview’ in Peter B. Kenen (ed), Managing the World
Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton Woods (Washington, DC: Institute for International
Economics, 1994) 3–57, at 7:
The International Monetary Fund was a formal structure intended to enforce an ex-
plicit set of rules; its Articles of Agreement contained a detailed list of international
monetary do’s and don’ts and established enforcement capabilities. Some of the rules
were not enforceable, however, and they failed to anticipate all the subsequent prob-
lems. The [GATT], by contrast, was an ad hoc agreement intended mainly to provide
a framework for pursuing nondiscriminatory, multilateral trade liberalization. Many
observers would now conclude that the GATT was the more effective arrangement.
The strength of a formal arrangement such as the IMF is its rigidity; that of an
informal, ideas-based institution such as the GATT is its adaptability. The greater
success of the GATT thus illustrates the importance for post-war economic perform-
ance of an adaptable institutional framework.
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went wrong with global economic policies that had worked so effectively for
nearly four decades?’37 He goes on to focus on the failure of the market in
subprime mortgages:
subprime mortgages pooled and sold as securities became subject to ex-
plosive demand from investors around the world. These mortgage backed
securities being ‘subprime’ were originally offered at what appeared to be
exceptionally high risk-adjusted market interest rates. But with US home
prices still rising, delinquency and foreclosure rates were deceptively
modest. Losses were minimal. By the most sophisticated investors in the
world, they were wrongly viewed as a ‘steal’.38
In an exchange with Henry Waxman, Chairman of the House Oversight
Committee and Government Reform, former Chairman Greenspan is asked
about the responsibility of regulators: ‘You had the authority to prevent ir-
responsible lending practices that led to the subprime crisis. You were
advised to do so by many others . . . .Do you feel that your ideology
pushed you to make decisions that you wish you had not made?’39
In response, Chairman Greenspan concedes: ‘Yes, I’ve found a flaw.
I don’t know how significant or permanent it is. But I’ve been very distressed
by that fact.’ In explaining his excessive faith in the self-correcting power of
free markets and his failure to anticipate the collapse of the mortgage lending
system, he states: ‘Those of us who looked to the self-interest of lending
institutions to protect shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of
shocked disbelief.’40 Finally, in his prepared comments, he made reference to
the power of regulation relative to the impact of market discipline: ‘Whatever
regulatory changes are made, they will pale in comparison to the change
already evident in today’s markets. . . .Those markets for an indefinite
37 Alan Greenspan, Prepared testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Reform, 23
October 2008. http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
3470&catid=42:hearings&Itemid=2 (visited 6 October 2010).
38 Ibid. http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3470&
catid=42:hearings&Itemid=2 (visited 6 October 2010).
39 Ibid. In his prepared testimony, Greenspan concentrates on the market for securitized sub-
prime loans:
It was the failure to properly price such assets that precipitated the crisis. . . .The
modern risk management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual
edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year [2007] because the data
inputted into the risk management models generally covered only the past two dec-
ades, a period of euphoria. Had instead the models been fitted more appropriately to
historic periods of stress, capital requirements would have been much higher and the
financial world would be in far better shape today, in my judgment. http://oversight.
house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3470&catid=
42:hearings&Itemid=2 (visited 6 October 2010).
40 See Edmund L. Andrews, ‘Greenspan Concedes Errors on Regulation’, New York Times, 23
October 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html (visited
30 September 2010).
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future will be far more restrained than would any currently contemplated
new regulatory regime.’41
This picture is filled out further by the testimony of Robert Rubin,
Chairman of the Board of Citibank, to the Financial Crisis Investigatory
Commission in questioning by Douglas Joltz-Eakin:
Mr. Rubin, you said no one could have foreseen this crisis and that was a
universally held belief. . . .The question is . . . could you have foreseen the
spark that lit the crisis, . . . the poor standards in underwriting, the poor
assessment of risks associated with mortgages, the inadequate hedging and
capital provisions . . . ? . . . In your experience, we have seen crises in
Mexico, in Thailand and in the Far East, wouldn’t there be grounds to
be suspicious at some point?42
Rubin responds:
It’s a good question . . . .I didn’t say no one could have foreseen [the crisis],
some people did foresee. What I said was that very few people foresaw the
full combination . . . .You had a large combination of forces that came
together . . . .I think it was this extraordinary combination of many factors
that came together and you can say well you can see some of these and
why didn’t that suggest that this could be a problem . . . .I actually did
worry about the excesses and talked about them in speeches in 2005
and 2006 . . . .What I didn’t see, and virtually nobody saw, was that it
wasn’t only those excesses but it was so many other factors coming to-
gether at that time and I think it’s that combination that led to this
crisis . . . .As long as we have had capital markets, we have had crises and
then when you look back . . .you say those were some obvious warning
signs but they weren’t obvious at the time. They were only obvious in
hindsight. I personally think unfortunately that market-based systems
which I believe in strongly, will have periodic down cycles and that is
why this financial reform effort is so extremely important.43
C. Characteristics of the robust regulatory system governing trade
While systemic risk is typically associated with financial systems and crises, it
seems to be applicable to the trading system and, indeed, provides a per-
spective from which all regulatory systems should be evaluated. As we saw in
the case of the Great Depression, the trading system failed in a systemic way,
that is, a shock resulted in reactions in one country that then triggered a
chain reaction throughout the global economy causing a breakdown in the
41 Ibid.
42 See n 43 below.
43 Robert Rubin Testimony to the Financial Crisis Investigative Commission, 8 April 2010,
transcribed from the audio available at http://www.cspan.org/Watch/Media/2010/04/08/HP/
R/31560/Govt+officials+testifying+Frmr+Citi+execs+apologize.aspx (visited 3 August 2010).
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entire framework for international trade. This pattern did not repeat itself
some 80 years later when the global economy went through a very similar
experience to that in 1929, namely a banking crisis that put enormous
pressure on governments to mitigate the impact of the crisis in their indi-
vidual markets by erecting barriers to international trade. While the G-20
governments called on one another44 to refrain from such measures, it does
not seem that this hortatory call explains the fact that governments re-
sponded very differently this time around, any more than hortatory calls
for countries to maintain the safety and soundness of their financial institu-
tions preserved the financial system from systemic failure. What then ex-
plains this difference?
Let’s start with Paul Blustein who, judging by the title of his recent book,
has quite a different view of the state of the international trading system:
Misadventures of the Most Favored Nations; Clashing egos, Inflated
Ambitions and the Great Shambles of the World Trade System. Blustein
takes a somewhat more measured view in the book itself: ‘The trading
system is at risk of joining the financial system in crisis. That is the central
message of this book, and the story of how the system reached this parlous
state will unfold in chapters to come.’45 Blustein provides an insightful and
readable account of the difficulty trading nations have had concluding the
Doha Round of trade negotiation and in doing so points out the most fun-
damental weakness of the international trading system, namely that the rule
making or legislative side of the system is not nearly as developed as the
juridical and rule enforcement side.46 One can juxtapose this view with the
one widely held among finance experts commenting on the WTO, that the
system is simply not enforcing its rules:
The WTO operates without any international enforcement powers and
relies on consensus among all member nations to establish policies con-
sistent with the agreed rules. Lack of enforcement often makes compliance
problematic, and agreements to reduce trade barriers can only be reached
after endless rounds of negotiation such as the currently ongoing Doha
44 Paragraph 48 of the Pittsburgh Summit Communique, 25 September 2009.
45 Paul Blustein, The Misadventures of the Most Favored Nations; Clashing Egos, Inflated Ambitions
and the Great Shambles of the World Trading System (New York: Public Affairs, 2010) 8.
Ultimately, Blustein comes to the conclusion that the question is not how to save the
Doha Round, but, in the words of Ernesto Zadillo, ‘how can the WTO be saved from the
Doha Round?’ (at page 281). The answer, says Blustein, seems to belie his characterization of
the system: ‘The most important goal is to ensure the survival of the rules-based trading
system. It is unwise to devote a lot of energy to opening markets more than they already are;
after eight rounds, global trade is already reasonably free. The focus should be on keeping
protectionism, and quasi-protectionism, from becoming long-lasting features of the interna-
tional economy, so that globalized trade can help the world recover and prosper anew’ (at
page 286).
46 Ibid, at 280.
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round. Progress has been made but, in the absence of any supranational
authority, it relies on the very gradual consensus building.47
In contrast, other finance experts see the WTO’s success in dispute settle-
ment and enforcement as the model for the international financial system.48
Those who measure the success of the trading system entirely against its
success in achieving the next generation of free trade objectives fail to ap-
preciate the value of preserving the gains of over three quarters of a century
of negotiations; what the European Union would call the acquis, the body of
rules to which all members must adhere. Indeed, it would be more accurate
to talk about the benefits of a well-regulated system of trade rather than free
trade because that is what we have. People who condemn the WTO solely
for its failure to deliver on the Doha Round agenda make the same mistake
as those who measured the success of the financial regulatory regime against
its ability to facilitate financial innovation by opening markets to ever more
exotic (and sometimes toxic) financial instruments. There is great merit in
pursuing a Doha Round deal to the extent that it can truly contribute to
global growth and recovery, but failure in this regard does not make the
existing rules outmoded or irrelevant. On the contrary, for all those who
earn their livelihood from trade, the WTO operates to reduce risk and there-
by cost, eliminate uncertainty and provide a critical source of stability for the
global economy. Moreover, that is why the WTO has become a magnet for
global regulatory issues from climate change to currency manipulation.
These views provide an appropriate set of cautions as we look with a
critical eye at what aspects of the trading system contributed most to its
ability to withstand the stress test of the Great Contraction. Even more
importantly, they form an integral part of the perception of this institution
and, as we have learned from the financial crisis, perceptions can play a large
role in influencing the market. George Akerlof and Robert Shiller have cri-
ticized traditional economics for its failure to understand the importance of
animal spirits in the functioning of the economy, namely ‘confidence, fair-
ness, corruption and antisocial behavior, money illusion and stories’.49 They
explain that economic theory has failed to appreciate that economic crises
‘are mainly caused by changing thought patterns. . . . It was caused precisely
by our changing confidence, temptations, envy, resentment, and illusions –
and especially by changing stories about the nature of the economy’.50
47 Viral V. Acharya, Paul Wachtel and Ingo Walter, ‘International Alignment of Financial Sector
Regulation’, in Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson (eds), Restoring Financial Stability:
How to Repair a Failed System (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2009) 365–76, at 372.
48 See Evenett, above n 9, at 218.
49 George A. Akerlof and Robert Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the
Economy and Why it Matters for Global Capitalism (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2009) 5.
50 Ibid, at 4.
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‘The public, and the regulators who were supposed to act on their behalf,
had failed to understand a fact of life that is totally obvious to everyone who
has played a serious team sport: there have to be rules and there has to be a
referee who enforces them – and a good and conscientious referee at that.’51
There are a number of characteristics of the GATT/WTO system that
appear relevant in explaining why the system performed so well as a systemic
regulator.
1. Rule-oriented system
The very essence of the WTO is what John Jackson has christened the
‘rule-oriented approach’ that focuses on the importance of predictability
and stability for those who must function within the international trading
system and for whom the size and nature of the ‘risk premium’ inherent in
international transactions can be the critical determinant for their long-term
decisions regarding investment. Ultimately, this predictability and stability
when institutionalized creates the base of a pyramid upon which many pri-
vate decisions are grounded and the larger and more secure that base, the
higher the pyramid can be built. The confidence that this set of rules can
withstand even exogenous shock like a financial crisis must be seen as the
ultimate validation for the role that rules can play.52
2. Alignment of incentives with the public good
Rules alone are not enough to protect a system from systemic risk. We know
that systemic risk is created when the actions of an individual may be ra-
tional and advance the individual’s interest but if everyone acts in the same
way the system may collapse. The rules must serve an overall objective with
incentives for behavior that is best for the overall public interest. Kenneth
Dam talks about the theory of the second best, that in a world of second
bests, it is not always clear whether the elimination of a particular barrier will
lead to greater efficiency.53 The GATT confronted the problem of how to
reconcile differing views of the function of international trade. While the
USA saw trade as critically important to the promotion of international ef-
ficiency, other countries, especially in the developing world, saw economic
development as their top priority. What the GATT and WTO have been able
51 Ibid, at xiii.
52 See Jackson, above n 27, at 88:
The phrase ‘rule orientation’ is used here to contrast with phrases such as ‘rule of law’,
and ‘rule-based system’. Rule orientation implies a less rigid adherence to ‘rule’ and
connotes some fluidity in rule approaches which seems to accord with reality (espe-
cially since it accommodates some bargaining or negotiations). Phrases that emphasize
too strongly the strict application of rules sometimes scare policy makers, although in
reality they may amount to the same thing.
53 Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1970) 6.
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to do through successive rounds of negotiations is focus the attention of
Members on the common good that comes from the accumulation of indi-
vidual concessions. In this respect, the GATT/WTO has followed Dam’s
advice of 1970 that it ‘attempt not only to resolve this conflict in values
but to aid governments in clarifying the common interest of all members
of the international trading community. Neither rules nor mere pragmatic
improvisations can do that’.54
The question is how negotiations can orient countries with essentially
mercantilist attitudes toward trade to serve the public good. Economic
theory (known as the market access or terms of trade theory) now tells us
that the principle of reciprocity which, although not required as a principle of
negotiations by any provision of the GATT/WTO agreements, provides a
critical incentive, particularly for large countries, to lower their trade bar-
riers.55 Reciprocity is operationalized in the GATT Article XXIII:1 provision
which provides members recourse in the event that they feel the benefits to
which they are entitled are being ‘nullified or impaired’ whether by a viola-
tion of the agreement, any measure, or any other situation.
Whether there is a counterpart in finance to the set of rules and an in-
ternal dynamic that ties those rules to the public good is a prime question for
public policy and is at the heart of the national legislative efforts for financial
regulatory reform.56 One way to replicate the benefit of the nullification or
impairment provision of the GATT/WTO would be to adopt, as a first prin-
ciple in an international financial agreement, the concept of systemic failure
and the concept that countries must regulate in such a way as to protect
against global systemic failure. Thus, as an analogy to GATT Article XXIII,
a global financial agreement would ensure that any member has recourse if it
faces the risk of a systemic crisis as a result of the actions of another
member, including a violation of any provision of the agreement, any other
measure (including the failure to regulate), or any other situation.
3. Dispute settlement and self-enforcement
While there are many examples of international agreements with elaborate
sets of rules, the WTO is unique in the scope and importance of its juridical
system for interpretation of the rules and the concentration of peer pressure
on a violator. The success of the dispute settlement mechanism as a means
of managing trade disputes—large and small, and between developed and
54 Ibid, at 7.
55 See Chad P. Bown, Self-Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009) 16: ‘There is nothing in the GATT
texts that requires countries to reciprocally negotiate market access liberalization.’
56 Financial reform legislation has been enacted in the United States which creates a Financial
Services Oversight Council to go with its European counterpart, the European Systemic Risk
Board. The focus of these regulatory bodies could well be the source of international initia-
tives to strengthen the international regulatory system as advocated in this paper. Dodd-Frank
Consumer Protection and Financial Reform Act, Public Law 111–203, 21 July 2010.
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developing countries—is the crown jewel of the global economic regulatory
order. Moreover, the rate of adherence to the WTO rules, both in general
and in response to disputes brought, is a singular achievement for the system
and is at the heart of its success as a systemic regulator in the face of the
recent crisis.
The counterpart to the market access theory is the commitment theory
that holds ‘without the threat that. . .foreign market access will be taken away
if one country deviates from the agreement by imposing new trade barriers,
market access openings could not be sustained through renegotiations
either’.57 Critical to the WTO model is that it does not involve an imperial
international bureaucracy that imposes its will on the Member but rather
‘the GATT/WTO is a set of self-enforcing agreements: member countries
enforce trading partners’ commitments embodied in the agreements by chal-
lenging each other’s missteps through forced dispute settlement’.58
4. Regulatory capture and the political economy underlying effective global
regulation
Rules and alignment with the public good still do not ensure that the system
will not be captured by those interests it seeks to regulate. In the case of the
WTO, ‘the rule system shelters national governments from the power of
protectionist groups within individualized economies . . . .The WTO has
been likened to a mast to which – like Odysseus – governments can tie
themselves to escape the siren-like calls of domestic interest groups and
even, to some extent, of their voters’.59
5. Comprehensive coverage—the domain of the regulatory system is coextensive
with the domain of the problem
The WTO rules are comprehensive in their coverage geographically as well
as functionally. WTO obligations cover 153 Members ‘comprising 93% of
world trade, and 87% of world population’.60 In geographical and demo-
graphic terms, the major breakthrough came with the admission of China on
11 December 2001, validating the WTO’s claim to be the ‘world’ trade
organization.61 From a functional perspective, the WTO has a comprehen-
sive approach to the regulation of international trade for it covers explicitly
any measure that a country may use to regulate trade. Moreover, the WTO
incorporated the GATT concept that a ‘nullification or impairment’ of the
benefits of the agreement could come from ‘the application by any Member
57 Bown, above n 55, at 19.
58 Ibid, at 20.
59 Horst Siebert, Rules for the Global Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) 76.
60 See Jackson, above n 27, at 135.
61 Russia remains the last major hold-out and has recently announced that it will proceed with
its own accession without linking its accession to that of its customs union partners—Belarus
and Kazakhstan: see Russia to pursue separate WTO bid, April 26, 2010, http://www.wto.
ru/en/news.asp?msg_id=26135 (visited 3 August 2010).
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of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions’ of one of the
constituent agreements or ‘the existence of any other situation’.62 While no
case of a non-violation nullification complaint has ever been successful and
the clause has been characterized as ‘of little practical significance’,63 the
provision takes on significance from a systemic perspective. For one, it pre-
cludes the possibility that parties might engineer a measure outside the scope
of the agreement. Furthermore, it acts as a kind of magnet, drawing issues
into the trade regulatory system that could emerge as the perception regard-
ing the scope of international trade versus domestic policy changes64 along
with the responsibility of trading nations to their partners in maintaining the
integrity of the regulatory system.
6. Transparency
A critical element in the success of the GATT/WTO is the use of transpar-
ency as a regulatory device. Members are required to disclose the measures
that they use to regulate trade and to include them in their Schedules of
Concessions.65 Transparency plays two roles: it enables the Members to
enforce one another’s commitments by directly monitoring them and it
forces Members to confront their own domestic constituencies with the real-
ity and substance of measures that end up imposing a cost on their domestic
economies. This transparency has worked over time to help forge the con-
stituencies of interest that then lobby for the elimination of barriers to
trade.66
Transparency as a device for financial regulation is a subject of consider-
able interest and complexity. Ken Rogoff cites transparency as one of the
most important roles for international institutions but points out how diffi-
cult it can be to obtain accurate data on things like government debt and the
composition of the Federal Reserve’s assets.67 A culture of nontransparency
seems to be a characteristic of the financial system, even though some
62 Article XXIII:1(c) of the GATT 1994 and Article 26.2 of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
63 Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008) 185.
64 See C. Fred Bergsten, ‘Managing the World Economy of the Future’ in Peter Kenan (ed),
Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years after Bretton Woods (Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics, 1994) 3–57, at 342: ‘International economic negotiations now rou-
tinely address, and even sometimes alter, policies traditionally viewed as ‘‘purely domestic.’’ ’
65 GATT Article II.
66 See generally Bown, above n 55 for the view that these constituencies did not develop in those
developing countries that were given special and differential treatment and were not required
to offer concessions in negotiations.
67 See Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of
Financial Folly (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009) 282: ‘One has only
to look at how opaque the United States government’s books have become during the 2007
financial crisis to see how helpful an outside standard would be. . .. The task of enforcing
transparency is easier said than done, for governments have many incentives to obfuscate their
books.’
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analysts see this as even more effective than supervision and limits on lever-
age.68 Complicating the picture is the view that the more transparency, the
more information is homogeneous which leads to markets reacting in the
same way to information and thereby creating systemic risk.69
7. Governance
The consensus-based system of the WTO has been its most widely criticized
dimension because of the obstacles it creates to the rule-making process. Yet,
when looked at from a systemic point of view, the legitimacy of the WTO is
grounded in this rule. China’s adherence to the WTO is in part attributable
to the legitimacy it gets from a principle of governance that contrasts to that
of the IMF (and other international financial institutions) where voting
power is allocated according to an economic formula that is static and re-
sistant to revision, even in the face of changes in underlying economic
alignments.
Ultimately, the sustainability of the trading system in the face of the real
world stress of the Great Contraction must stand as the highlight of an
extraordinary history. The story is far from over and enormous pressures
on the system continue to be felt, but the structure held with the ongoing
support of the Members. The so-called bicycle theory of the international
trading system—which holds that without forward progress on trade liberal-
ization, the system would lose its balance and fall over—has not been proven,
at least in this recent crisis.
III. CONCLUSION—THE QUEST FOR COHERENCE
At the heart of this article is the idea that we need to pull the covers back
and face the real challenges of regulation in our globalized world. Coherence
can only be achieved by adopting a mindset, tools and analytical frameworks
that enable us to look at the ‘nuts and bolts’ as well as at the way the entire
system fits together. If all economics is global and all politics are local, then
regulators work in that space where the two come together and can only be
reconciled by making economics work for the community and ensuring that
all political decisions are taken with an eye to their impact on the global
community. What Jack Welch called a culture of ‘boundarylessness’70 is a
necessary component of our regulatory culture, by which he meant that one
68 See Barth et al., above n 11, at 312.
69 See discussion of the importance of heterogeneity in markets and the problem created by
equal information in Alexander et al., above n 5, at 261: ‘But the attainment of equal infor-
mation is bought at a cost—increased homogeneity and, hence, potentially reduced liquidity.’
70 Jack Welch was the CEO of General Electric from 1981 to 2001. See Jack Welch, Straight
From The Gut (Warner Books Inc., 2001).
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must respect the limits of one’s own responsibility while being mindful of the
impact and need to share across functions and organizations.
We have just lived through the most dramatic economic event of our gen-
eration and, while there is an air of normalcy to this recovery, we have yet to
digest the real consequences and implications of this crisis for the global
economy.
From the perspective of the past 80 years and through the prism of global
regulation, it appears that the worlds of trade and finance have evolved in
two dramatically different directions, with the world of finance characterized
by an almost pathological antipathy to regulation while the trade world has
developed through trial and error an extensive set of rules, adjudication and
dispute settlement mechanisms and sanctions which together have ensured a
high degree of enforcement and compliance. This difference has conse-
quences and helps to explain the relative performance of the two systems
in the course of the real world crisis.
So the question can legitimately be posed: does the trading system deserve
a voice in efforts to ensure global stability? The reason for an affirmative
response is twofold. First, the trading system has experience in designing and
operating a successful systemic regulatory system that for all the claimed
differences between regulating trade and finance has in fact confronted
many of the same problems facing the world of finance, such as rule
making, sovereignty, political economy, reconciling conflicting values, eco-
nomic theories and governance to name but a few. Second, the trading
system has a huge stake in the outcome of the financial reform process for
the same reason that the financial system was created, namely to facilitate
payment and finance of international trade transactions. In fact, it is fair to
say that trade started out as the weak sister in the Bretton Woods system and
now it is the tent-pole holding up a system in which the other two pillars are
showing signs of extreme distress.
This reality leads to the question: why does the WTO not have a seat on
the Financial Stability Board? Have we not learned that taking a fragmented
approach to the regulation of the global economy is flawed? Is it not possible
that the next systemic risk could come from the inability of the trading
system to hold up the global economy while the world of finance works its
way through the political obstacles to reform? And is there not some chance
that a representative of arguably the most successful systemic regulator in the
history of humankind might have something to offer to an attempt to fun-
damentally restructure the regulatory system of finance?
This analysis raises a host of other questions that deserve further examin-
ation. Do we need a greater convergence in the global regulatory regimes
governing trade and finance? Do we need a new paradigm for understanding
global regulation that gets beyond the polarized debate over regulation versus
deregulation? What are the implications for how we view the Doha Round
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and other efforts at the further liberalization of trade? How do we look at the
interplay of rules and governance? What stake does the private sector have in
the outcome of this debate and is the private sector playing an effective role
in proposing solutions to the underlying problem of how to harness the
benefits of globalization while managing the risks that are inevitably a part
of making it work?
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